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Research on intelligent transport systems (ITS) for improved
traffic safety and efficiency has reached a high level of maturity
and first applications will hit the market in 2019. Since 2004,
the wireless standard 802.11p has been developed specifically for
ITS services. Since then new telecommunication standards have
been devised, and the new 5G telecommunication standard is
nearing completion. Due to its technological advantages such
as higher speeds and reliability, it is being considered to be
used for ITS services. The new radio technology “New Radio
(NR)”, which is being developed as part of 5G, can complement
or replace 802.11p in V2X applications. While there has been
some work to compare 802.11p and 5G New Radio in terms of
performance and applicability for safety-critical use cases, little
work has been done to investigate the implications for security. In
this paper, we provide an overview of the security requirements
of known ETSI ITS use cases, and based on those use cases we
compare and assess the security implications of replacing 802.11p
with cellular V2X. We find that due to the use of millimeter
waves, beamforming and massive MIMO, there will be an implicit
improvement for confidentiality and privacy, and it may also be
possible to shorten authentication procedures in certain cases.
When a fully network-assisted C-V2X mode is chosen, it is also
possible to outsource several of the ITS security requirements to
the cellular network.
Index Terms—Security, 5G, ITS, V2X, ETSI, VANET, 802.11p,
New Radio
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS) aim at
improving road safety and traffic efficiency while also reducing
environmental impact. They achieve this by enabling vehicles
and roadside infrastructures to communicate and exchange
safety-relevant messages. These messages contain information
such as road hazards, speed, location, size, and direction of
ITS nodes and are sent over Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
(VANETs). VANETs enable vehicles and responsible authori-
ties to distribute traffic information and safety relevant warn-
ings.
In Europe, the European Telecommunication Standards
Institute (ETSI) has introduced the ETSI ITS G5 (ITSC)
standard [1] to enable the implementation of so called Vehicle-
to-Anything (V2X) communication. The ITSC standard is
based on IEEE 802.11p with some amendments towards
European requirements. This standard enables dedicated short
range communications between vehicles and Road Side Units
(RSUs), and its effective range of application is up to 500
meters [2]. Moreover, it defines a communication architecture
and a standardized set of services and interfaces that enable
secure V2X communications.
In addition to the 802.11p based V2X standard, the 3rd
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), which is responsible
for many telecommunication standards and projects, has in-
vestigated the possibility of using the Advanced Long Term
Evolution (Advanced LTE) cellular network for V2X commu-
nications. 3GPP and ETSI collaborated to develop standards to
enhance LTE communications for V2X applications [3, 4]. The
new telecommunication standard under development, 5G, and
the related new radio technology “New Radio (NR)” promise
significant improvements w.r.t network latency, throughput
and reliability in V2X communications. The development and
standardization of 5G for V2X communications is ongoing
and the 5G Automotive Associations (5GAA) is developing
5G enabled solutions for V2X applications [5].
Although V2X communications offer safety and environ-
mental benefits, there are also security and privacy concerns.
The V2X messages exchanged between ITS users often con-
tain data such as speed, direction and GPS coordinates. There-
fore, it must be ensured that V2X messages cannot be linked
to individuals. Furthermore, due to their safety-critical nature,
ITS messages should be protected against tampering and
injection of data by unauthorized entities, which can mislead
the drivers and lead to road accidents or redirecting traffic flow.
In particular, ETSI has introduced a security architecture that
offers pseudonymity, confidentiality, authenticity and integrity
services by using certificate authorities and identity manage-
ment procedures.
Since the 802.11p protocol itself does not provide any
mechanisms for authenticating ITS users for performance
reasons, ETSI ITSC addresses security and privacy concerns
with services in the higher layers of the communication stack.
In this paper we consider whether 5G V2X can facilitate
security features at lower levels, and what the security impact
of replacing 802.11p with 5G NR in the ETSI stack would be.
Our contributions are that we (1) analyze the security require-
ments of ETSI ITS use cases, (2) investigate the properties
of 5G NR that can be used for physical layer security and
(3) explore the security implications of using 5G V2X for the
ETSI ITS use cases.
II. RELATED WORK
We will shortly present some related work to put our
work into context. Filippi et al. [6] compare 802.11p and 5G
for V2X applications, but they focus exclusively on safety.
Similarly, Vukadinovic et al. [7] compare the two technologies
for the particular V2X use case “platooning”, once again
with a focus on safety and performance. Bian et al. [8] on
the other hand provide an overview of the security in V2X
use cases. Gupta and Jha [9] and Agiwal et al. [10] present
surveys of emerging 5G technologies, while Shah et al. [11]
discuss the building blocks of 5G which are of interest for V2X
applications. Finally, Ahmad et al. [12] provide an overview
of 5G security from an architectural perspective.
III. V2X COMMUNICATION
Currently, there are two underlying technologies that enable
V2X communication, namely IEEE 802.11p and cellular tech-
nologies. In this section, we first describe different communi-
cation scenarios in V2X communication, and then explain how
802.11p based V2X and Cellular V2X (C-V2X) technologies
enable these scenarios to support a set of ITS applications.
A. V2X Communication Scenarios
V2X communication has several components including
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Roadside Unit (V2R)
and Vehicle-to-Network (V2N) communications. V2N com-
munication always has to go through a base station (BS)
or an RSU, but for V2V and V2R different communication
scenarios exist depending on the underlying V2X technology.
We distinguish three general types of communication scenar-
ios: direct communication, fully-network assisted and semi
network-assisted communication.
In direct communication, vehicles and RSUs are able to
exchange messages without the need to establish a connection
to network infrastructure prior to data exchange. This is the
only supported mode for the comparatively low data transmis-
sion rate technology 802.11p, in order to be able to fulfill the
low-latency and high-reliability requirements of safety related
messages. Through the addition of a special interface called
PC5, cellular based V2X nodes are also capable of direct
communication without network assistance (Figure 1a). In a
fully network-assisted scenario, which is the traditional cellular
use-case, all communication has to go through the base station
(BS) (Figure 1b). In a semi network-assisted scenario, vehicles
and RSUs may use a combination of direct communication and
network-assisted communication thus effectively extending the
range of V2X applications (Figure 1c).
B. 802.11p Based V2X
V2X communications based on 802.11p radio technology
have been standardized by ETSI to enable dedicated short-
range communications in the unlicensed 5.9 GHZ band. ETSI
has provided several standards for ITSC that describe the
Basic Set of Applications (BSA) [13], the communication
architecture [14], the protocol stack [15, 16], the messages [17,
18], and the security requirements, services and architec-
ture [19, 20, 21, 22]. In these standards, the end nodes are
called ITS stations. The Cooperative Awareness Message
(CAM) and Decentralized Environmental Notification Mes-
sage (DENM) are two fundamental message types exchanged
between ITS stations. These messages may contain sensitive
data such as speed, location, dynamics and attributes of ITS
stations.
As stated by ETSI, it must be ensured that ITSC messages
do not leak any personally identifying information (e.g., lo-
cation or identity of the ITS station) to any unauthorized
parties [21]. Furthermore, ITS stations should be trusted before
being granted specific services and applications that require au-
thorization (e.g., claim priority rights for emergency vehicles).
In order to address these security and privacy requirements,
ETSI has introduced a security architecture that provides
pseudonymity, confidentiality, authenticity and integrity which
is achieved by using certificates, security headers and trailers
(SecuredMessage), security profiles and identity management
services. ETSI has also introduced a hierarchy of Certificate
Authorities (CAs) [20] that are responsible for issuing and re-
voking different types of digital certificates. These certificates
enable the ITS stations to authenticate and authorize their ITS
messages without revealing their identity.
C. Cellular V2X
In 2016, the mobile industry body 3GPP standardized the
use of LTE networks as an underlying technology for V2X
communication in Release 14 [23]. LTE-V2X benefits from the
wide coverage, broad bandwidth and long transmission range
of already established cellular networks. In addition to the
Direct communication (V2V, V2R) in the 5.9 GHZ spectrum
band (Figure 1a), C-V2X enables vehicles and roadside units
to exchange messages over the commercially-licensed cellular
spectrum through a V2X application server (V2N). In the
Direct mode, which is typically referred to as Device to
Device (D2D) mode, vehicles and roadside units communicate
over Sidelink channels using a PC5 radio interface without
relying on the cellular network to send the traffic [24]. The
C-V2X standard is compatible with both 4G and 5G and the
introduction and deployment of 5G networks will enhance C-
V2X by enabling precise positioning, high throughput, high
reliability and low latency data transmission.
The 3GPP consortium has identified security and privacy
requirements [3], where C-V2X users shall be authenticated
before employing the cellular network for V2X communica-
tion, and the integrity of the transmitted data shall be protected
by measures provided by the network. Moreover, for sensitive
V2X services and sensitive data such as cryptographic keys
in transition or at rest, the confidentiality of message content
shall be protected. Also, the pseudonymity and privacy of V2X
users shall be protected, by ensuring that the user’s identity
cannot be tracked or identified by any other V2X user, nor
by any single party (operator or third party). Although V2N
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Fig. 1: Different scenarios for V2V and V2R communications
existing cellular network Authentication and Key Agreement
(AKA) protocol, direct communications between vehicles and
RSUs may rely on the security mechanisms provided by other
standards (e.g. ITSC) [25].
D. Basic Set of Applications
ETSI [13] has identified four major V2X application classes,
namely Active Road Safety, Cooperative Traffic Efficiency,
Cooperative Local Services and Global Internet Services. Each
application class is further divided into smaller applications,
where each application consists of several use cases. The
Active Road Safety applications focus on informing the sur-
rounding vehicles about hazardous incidents on the road such
as roadwork or collision risk warning, and drivers’ potentially
dangerous behavior such as lane change and overtaking. The
Cooperative Traffic Efficiency applications aim at optimizing
the traffic efficiency by enabling vehicles and infrastructures
to exchange messages related to speed management and co-
operative navigation. The Cooperative Local Services group
consists of location based services that enable RSUs to deliver
local services such as access control and parking management
to passing vehicles. The Global Internet Services allow
vehicles and RSUs to connect to the Internet and enable
services such as fleet management, stolen vehicle alert, vehicle
software/data provisioning and instant messaging.
IV. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF ETSI ITS USE CASES
In order to assess the impact of introducing 5G NR in V2X
communications, we detail the security requirements for ITS
applications and base our assessment on these requirements.
As outlined in section III-D, there are four main ETSI ITS
application classes that consist of different use cases [13],
which have different security requirements. In this Section,
we present and motivate these requirements and provide an
in-depth analysis of different application use cases. For each
use case, we study the requirements w.r.t security attributes
identified by ETSI, which are confidentiality, integrity, avail-
ability, privacy and authentication. The results of our analysis
are summarized in Table I.
A. Active Road Safety
The Active Road Safety use cases are safety-critical, thus
they have high reliability and real-time requirements in order
to be shown to the driver as soon as possible.
Confidentiality: Given that all vehicles and relevant road
side units have to be capable of receiving and processing the
cooperative awareness messages and road hazard warnings, the
ETSI ITS standard has not specified confidentiality require-
ments for this class of use cases. Furthermore, the messages
that enable these use cases do not carry any sensitive data that
require confidentiality.
Integrity: The information exchanged in Active Road Safety
messages are safety-critical, thus they have to be protected
against modifications. Therefore, this class of use cases have
strict integrity requirements.
Availability: This class of use cases have strict availability
requirements due to their high reliability and real-time require-
ments.
Authentication: In all Active Road Safety use cases the
receiver has to verify whether the sender of the message is a
trustable (authorized) ITS station.
Privacy: Some of the Active Road Safety use cases are
based on messages broadcasted by RSUs (e.g. Roadwork
warning and Signal violation warning) that do not contain
privacy sensitive information. However, most of road safety
use cases are based on messages broadcasted by vehicles (e.g.
Slow vehicle indication)which contain privacy sensitive data
such as vehicle’s current location and direction. An attacker
should not be able to link such information collected from
disperse locations and times to a vehicle. Therefore, privacy
is a concern for this class of applications.
B. Cooperative Traffic Efficiency
The Cooperative Traffic Efficiency use cases are enabled
by permanently broadcasting authoritative messages triggered
by traffic management entities, to enhance traffic efficiency
and reduce the pollution created by vehicles. Although this
application class is not safety-critical, misuse of its use cases
can potentially lead to traffic incidents.
Confidentiality: The Cooperative Traffic Efficiency mes-
sages are broadcasted to all ITS stations within a certain
geographical area and do not contain sensitive information that
require confidentiality.
Integrity: Although the integrity of the messages that carry
traffic information should be verified by the receivers, the
exchanged messages are not as safety-critical as the Active
Road Safety messages.
Applications Class Application Use case V2X Conf. Integ. Avail. Authen. Priv.
Emergency vehicle warning V 0 2 2 2 2
Slow vehicle indication V 0 2 2 2 2
Intersection collision warning VR 0 2 2 2 2
Overtaking vehicle warning V 0 2 2 2 2
Lane change V 0 2 2 2 2





Motorcycle approaching indicator VR 0 2 2 2 2
Emergency electronic brake lights VRN 0 2 2 2 2
Stationary vehicle VRN 0 2 2 2 2
Wrong way driving warning VRN 0 2 2 2 1
Traffic condition warning VRN 0 2 2 2 1
Signal violation warning R 0 2 2 2 0
Roadwork warning VR 0 2 2 2 0
Collision risk warning VR 0 2 2 2 1







Decentralized floating car data VRN 0 2 2 2 1
Regulatory / contextual speed limits notification RN 0 2 1 2 0Speed
Management Traffic light optimal speed advisory R 0 2 1 2 0
Traffic information and recommended itinerary R 0 2 1 2 0
Enhanced route guidance and navigation RN 0 2 1 2 0






In-vehicle signage R 0 2 1 2 0
Point of Interest notification R 0 2 1 2 0
Automatic access control and parking management RN 2 2 1 2 2







Media downloading RN 2 2 1 2 2
Insurance/financial services RN 2 2 1 2 2
Fleet management RN 2 2 1 2 2
Communities
Services
Loading zone management RN 2 2 1 2 2




Cycle Management Vehicle-RSU sensor data calibration RN 0 2 1 2 0
TABLE I: ITS use cases and their security requirements: 0 = not required, 1 = intermediate, 2 = strict
Availability: These use cases are less time critical than the
Active Road Safety applications. Thus, they do not have high
availability requirements.
Authentication: For all use cases in this application class,
the receivers have to verify the authenticity of the RSU that
disseminates the traffic information. Moreover, the receivers
have to verify whether the RSU is authorized to send traffic
advisory messages.
Privacy: All use cases in this application class are based on
privacy-insensitive messages sent by RSUs.
C. Cooperative Local Services and Global Internet Services
These two classes of applications aim at advertising and
providing on-demand commercial or non-commercial infor-
mation to passing vehicles. Global Internet Services rely on
service providers on the Internet and relay ITS messages
to the Internet, while the Cooperative Local Services are
enabled by the services provided from within the ITS network
infrastructure.
Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication and Privacy: Al-
most all use cases in these applications have high requirements
for confidentiality, integrity, authentication and privacy. This
is mainly because the exchanged ITS messages may carry
sensitive information (e.g. financial or insurance information)
that are only meant to be shared with authorized entities,
or privacy sensitive information such as vehicle parameters,
vehicle type, geographical position and delivery time that can
be used to associate ITS identities to individuals. The only
exceptions are the Point of interest notification and Vehicle
and RSU sensor data calibration services that do not exchange
messages with personal or confidential content.
Availability: None of these use cases has high availability
and real-time requirements as the they are not safety critical.
Overall, it can be noted from Table I, that the use cases
with safety impacts require integrity, availability, authentica-
tion and privacy, while confidentiality do not seem to be a
major concern. On the other hand, use cases that rely on
communications with external entities on the Internet have
high confidentiality requirements.
V. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF USING 5G NR IN V2X
APPLICATIONS
In order to investigate to which degree V2X security mech-
anisms can be simplified or removed from higher layers when
C-V2X and 5G are used, we consider the new physical layer
of 5G, a technology simply called New Radio (NR). Release
15 of 3GPP, which has a first full specification of NR, was
published in June 2018. Further improvements to 5G are
expected in the future release 16, and several researchers have
proposed security enhancements that might be of interest.
A. 5G New Radio (NR) and Physical Layer Security
NR is being developed for various communication needs
and is expected to provide faster and more reliable commu-
nication. The key applications that have been identified by
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) for 5G are
enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB), ultra-reliable and low-
latency communications (URLLC), and massive machine type
communications (mMTC) [26]. The resulting target require-
ments are significant improvements over older technology.
For instance, the peak data rate should be 20 Gbit/s and
the user plane latency should be below 1 ms for URLLC
applications such as V2X applications. In order to fulfill these
requirements, several new technologies are being utilized for
NR, including millimeter waves (mmWave), beamforming and
massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO). In addition to
the performance and reliability advantages, these technologies
also offer new possibilities for physical layer security.
The idea of physical layer security (PLS) for wireless
networks based on information theoretic security [27] has been
around since 1975 [28], but in the last two decades the ideas
have become more practical [29, 30]. The underlying idea
is to use physical properties of the transmission medium1 to
secure a channel which avoids the overhead of cryptography
[30, 31]. Many of these ideas apply to wireless communication
in general, but there are some PLS mechanisms that apply
specifically to the technologies used by 5G NR.
One security concern in wireless communication is authen-
ticity. As long as the environment is sufficiently stable, a
wireless channel has a unique fingerprint of physical properties
that identifies it, which can be used to authenticate a previously
established connection [31, 32, 33]. This essentially allows
authentication based on sender/receiver location, because if the
location or the environment changes significantly, the physical
channel fingerprint will change as well. This assumption may
not hold in vehicular networks where communicating nodes
move at high speeds [31, 32], but Al-Momani et al. [32] argue
that due to the high frequency of messages their method of
re-authentication may still be of use. The idea is to establish
initial authenticity via cryptographic means, but to skip the
cryptographic authentication of following messages as long as
the physical fingerprint matches.
1) Millimeter Waves and Beamforming: Millimeter wave
technology can provide higher data transmission rates and
broader bandwidth by using a wavelength of 1 - 10 mm
(with carrier waves between 30 and 300 GHz), thus allowing
for much smaller antennas [34, 35]. The short wavelength
introduces some new challenges such as sensitivity to weather
conditions and blocking objects, and a shorter maximum range
(∼1 km). However, the small antenna size enables the use of
multiple antennas to overcome those challenges with narrowly
focused beams. This beamforming is achieved by utilizing the
antennas in such a way that there is constructive interference
in the desired signal direction and destructive interference in
all other directions. This can increase the signal strength and
thus the effective range significantly. Using beamforming in
V2X applications is rather challenging due to the fast moving
communicating nodes. Tracking algorithms offer potential
solutions, and this is an active research area.
A common assumption in physical layer security is that
the high directionality achieved with narrow beams implies
confidentiality and privacy, because a potential eavesdropper
1typically channel state information (CSI)
would have to move to intercept. However, Steinmetzer et
al. [36] found that narrow beams offer less protection than
commonly assumed, because small objects can reflect the
beam strongly enough to eavesdrop. Nevertheless, eavesdrop-
ping is harder when narrow beams are used [31, 37].
2) Massive MIMO: The idea of multiple-input-multiple-
output (MIMO) systems is to use multiple antennas on the
transmitting and receiving end to exploit multipath propagation
to increase channel capacity. Multipath propagation describes
the effect that, due to reflecting objects in typical indoor
or urban environments, there are several paths a radio wave
can take. If not accounted for, multipath propagation leads
to channel fading, but if utilized properly for spatial diver-
sity (same signal, different paths) and spatial multiplexing
(different signals, different paths) with multiple antennas, it
can improve the channel capacity instead [38]. Traditional
MIMO systems have 2 to 8 antennas, but with the advent
of millimeter waves it is possible to use many more antennas,
a configuration commonly termed massive MIMO [34, 39].
Advantages of massive MIMO include increased data rate,
increased signal to noise ratio, more stable and predictable
channel conditions, and increased potential for physical layer
security [40]. In addition to the reduced information leakage
due to higher directionality, some of the antennas can also be
used to transmit artificial noise to confuse eavesdroppers [31].
B. C-V2X Security for ETSI ITS Use Cases
802.11p has no security on the physical or link-layer since
the performance degradation was considered too costly. Cel-
lular V2X offers an alternative to 802.11p, and with the sig-
nificantly improved performance of 5G NR it might be worth
to reconsider physical layer security. The initial releases of C-
V2X referred to LTE only, but newer versions integrate with
5G. While the use of 5G new radio in all V2X communication
scenarios is a long term goal, at the moment the technology
can only be fully utilized on base stations or roadside units.
There are still several open research questions before 5G NR
can be deployed on vehicles. This is why only LTE can be
used for direct sidelink communication via PC5 (see Figure
1a) in the near future, but 5G NR can be used in network-
assisted scenarios (see Figures 1b and 1c). In the following
we assess which of the security requirements of the ETSI
ITS use cases (see Table I) could be handled by lower layers
when C-V2X and 5G NR are used. Since the security that
can be offered depends heavily on the type of communication
(direct communication vs network-assisted), we discuss those
types separately. However, for direct communication and semi
network-assisted communication the same argument applies
for all use cases, so we group them here for all use cases:
Direct Communication (V2V, V2R): Since 5G NR can
not be used for direct communication yet and LTE network
security can also not be used (no network coverage), there are
no security advantages.
Semi-Assisted Network (V2V, V2R, V2N): For the direct
communication part, the argument above applies, and for the
network-assisted parts, the argument for the fully network-
assisted part below applies.
1) Active Road Safety: Due to their safety-critical nature, all
of the applications in the active road safety class have strict
requirements for integrity, availability and authenticity. About
half of the use cases also have strong privacy requirements.
Fully network-assisted (V2V, V2R, V2N): If all communica-
tion goes over a cellular base station, integrity and authenticity
are implicitly covered by LTE or 5G, because all messages are
signed and encrypted. Privacy is partly covered through the
encryption, but the nature of privacy is slightly more complex:
the identity of the sender should not be revealed. Therefore,
the use of temporary identities is important. When 5G NR
is being used, re-authentication via the physical layer could
also be considered to speed up the process, and the highly
directional communication increases privacy.
2) Cooperative Traffic Efficiency: Since applications for
cooperative traffic efficiency are not about individual drivers,
there are no privacy or confidentiality concerns. However,
malicious manipulation of such messages could have negative
safety consequences, so message integrity and authenticity
must be ensured. The availability requirements are not strict
since a lost message has no serious consequences.
Fully network-assisted (V2V, V2R, V2N): Once again,
integrity and authenticity are implicitly covered by LTE or 5G,
and re-authentication via the physical layer might be possible.
3) Cooperative Local Services and Global Internet Services:
The most stringent security requirements apply to cooperative
local services and global internet services, since most of them
involve transactions for individual users. Once again, since the
applications are not safety-critical, availability is not a major
concern, with the exception of software updates which may
have safety and security implications.
Fully network-assisted (V2V, V2R, V2N): Once again,
integrity, authenticity and confidentiality are implicitly covered
by LTE or 5G, and re-authentication via the physical layer
might be possible. For privacy, the same argument as for active
road safety applies.
VI. CONCLUSION
In order to understand the security implications of using
C-V2X and 5G New Radio (NR) for V2X communications,
we analyze the security requirements for ETSI ITS use cases
and we explore some physical layer security mechanisms that
could be adopted for 5G NR.
We find that due to the use of millimeter waves, beamform-
ing and massive MIMO, there will be an implicit improvement
for confidentiality and privacy, and it may also be possible
to shorten authentication procedures in certain cases. When
a fully network-assisted C-V2X mode is chosen, it is also
possible to outsource several of the ITS security requirements
to the cellular network.
Our assessment highlights some encouraging synergies that
can be achieved by bringing 5G and ITS together, and C-V2X
in general seems to have a positive impact on security.
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